I. Introduction
There is now a substantial literature that examines corporate capital expenditures. For example, although firms tend to invest more following increases in their stock prices, cash flows tend to be the best predictor of a firm's investment expenditures (see, for example, Fazzari, Hubbard, and Peterson (1988) and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990)).1 It is also the case that stock prices tend to respond favorably to announcements of major capital investment.2 However, financing choices that are associated with increased investment, such as equity issuances, the previously documented anomalies may be generating the negative abnormal capital expenditure/return relation that we document. However, we find that this is not the case. Indeed, we find the negative abnormal capital expenditure/return relation is independent of the long-term return reversal and secondary equity issue anomalies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly discusses the experimental design of the tests and data requirements and Section III outlines the methodology. The findings on the relationship between abnormal capital investments and expected returns are presented in Section IV. Section V examines the agency cost explanation for the negative abnormal investment/return relation. In particular, we examine whether the negative relation between abnormal capital investments and subsequent stock returns behaves differently between firms with investment discretion and those without discretion. Section VI reports the robustness tests on the relation and, finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. Experimental Design and Data Description
To test the relation between abnormal capital investments and subsequent stock returns we examine the returns on portfolios formed on the basis of abnormal levels of capital investment. More specifically, we test whether returns on portfolios with low abnormal capital investments are significantly higher than those with high abnormal capital investments. Once the negative relation between abnormal capital investments and subsequent stock returns is established, we investigate possible explanations for this negative relation by separating firms into two groups based on their investment discretion as measured by cash flows or leverage. We then examine whether the magnitude of the negative relation between abnormal capital investment and subsequent stock returns is substantially different between these two groups of firms.
To carry out these tests, we consider all domestic, primary stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (Amex), and Nasdaq stock markets. Following Fama and French (1992) , (1993), we exclude closed-end funds, trusts, ADRs, REITs, units of beneficial interest, and other financial institutions. The monthly data on stock returns, stock prices, and number of shares outstanding are obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The U.S. one-month Treasury bill rates are used as risk-free rates. Financial statement data, such as book equity, cash flows, long-term debt, and sales are obtained from the COMPUSTAT tapes. While the sample period for financial data covers from 1969 to 1995, the test period or the sample period for stock returns covers from July 1973 to June 1996.
To be included in the tests, a firm must meet the following criteria. First, it should have the CRSP stock prices for December of year t -1 and June of year t and the COMPUSTAT book equity for year t -1. Second, its annual total net sales should be no less than U.S.$10 million to exclude firms at their early stage of development. Third, it should not have negative book equity for the fiscal year ending in calendar year t -1. Moreover, following Fama and French (1992) , (1993), firms are not included until they have appeared in COMPUSTAT for two years to avoid the potential survival/selection bias inherent in the way COMPUSTAT adds firms to its tapes (Banz and Breen (1986) ).
A firm's market equity (ME) is defined as its price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding, and its market size (SZ) is measured as the ME at the end of June of year t. The book-to-market equity ratio (BM) is computed as the ratio of the book equity (BE) of a firm for the fiscal year ending in calendar year t -1 to the firm's ME at the end of December of t -1. As in Fama and French (1993) , we define book equity as the COMPUSTAT book value of stockholders' equity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credits (if available), minus the book value of the preferred stock. Depending on availability, the redemption, liquidation, or par value (in that order) is used to estimate the value of the preferred stock.
In the results reported in this paper, the measure of abnormal capital investment (CIt-1) in the formation year t is calculated as follows, ( 
1)
CIt=-1=-1I
where CEt-1 is a firm's capital expenditures (COMPUSTAT data item 128) scaled by its sales in year t -1. We use the last three-year average capital expenditures to project the firm's formation year's benchmark investment, and interpret firms with high CI as high investors. The formation year t is the year when the year t -1 CI is measured and the CI portfolios are formed (i.e., the returns from July of year t to June of year t + 1 are matched against with CIt-1). Using sales as the deflator, we implicitly assume that the benchmark level of capital expenditures will grow proportionately with sales. By this definition, a CI value equal to (greater than, less than) zero indicates that the formation year's capital investment is the same as (greater than, less than) the prior three years' average. Our definition of CI can actually be viewed as a measure of abnormal investment. To see how the results are sensitive to the measure of CI, we also use CEt-1-(CEt-2+
CEt-3+CEt-4)/3, CEt-1 alone, replacing the last three-year average with the last five-year average capital expenditures in equation (1), and the CI measure without deflating to measure CI, 1. In addition, we also use total assets to replace sales as the deflator in all CI measures. The results (not reported here) are basically insensitive to alternative measures of CI. To ensure that accounting information is known before we use it to explain the stock returns, following Fama and French (1992), we match stock returns for the period between July of year t to June of year t + 1 (which is referred to as the test period or the year 1 returns after formation year t) to the accounting data (including CI) of a firm for the fiscal year ending in calendar year t -1. Firms with one or more missing monthly returns are excluded from the sample for that particular year. Our initial sample includes 58,880 industrial firm-years (an average of 2,560 firms a year) that are available in CRSP and COMPUSTAT for at least two years. The sample is reduced to an average of 1,902 firms a year, since we require a firm to have at least four years of data to first compute its abnormal capital investment and then to match with the subsequent stock returns. The sample size is further reduced to an average of 1,725 firms a year, when we exclude firms with missing stock returns in the testing period. Finally, by excluding firms that do not meet data requirements on sales and book equity, we obtain a final sample that has an average of 1,635 firms a year.
11I. Methodology
We use three different approaches for evaluating the returns of the various investment strategies that we consider. The first approach measures excess returns relative to benchmarks that are constructed to have very similar firm characteristics (i.e., size, book to market, and momentum) as the evaluated portfolio. The second approach applies Carhart's (1997) adaptation of the Fama and French (1993) method of calculating excess returns. Finally, we follow Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter (1992) to examine returns around a short window surrounding the firms' earnings announcement dates.
A. Characteristic-Based Benchmark Portfolios
Firms with different levels of investment expenditures are likely to be subject to different types of risk. One might expect that firms that invest the most are the riskiest, since a greater fraction of their value consists of growth options. Alternatively, since the least risky firms have the lowest cost of capital, they may invest the most. In any event, when one compares the returns of firms that invest high and low amounts, it is critical that appropriate benchmarks are chosen. Here we will be controlling for firm characteristics as well as factor sensitivities.
Our procedure for calculating benchmark-adjusted returns follows the methodology outlined in the Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) study that developed benchmarks to evaluate mutual fund performance. Specifically, we form 125 benchmark portfolios that capture three stock characteristics, namely book-to-market equity, size, and momentum, which are significantly related to the cross-sectional variation in returns.3 These benchmark portfolios are formed as follows. First, starting with July of year t, the universe of common stocks is sorted into five portfolios based on each firm's size (SZ) at the end of June of year t according to the breakpoints for the NYSE firms. The breakpoints for size are obtained by sorting NYSE firms into quintiles based on their SZ measures at the end of June of year t in ascending order. The size of each firm in our sample is then compared with the breakpoints to decide which portfolio the firm belongs to. Firms in each SZ portfolio are further equally sorted into quintiles based on their book-to-market ratio (BM) at the end of year t -1. Finally, the firms in each of the 25 SZ/BM portfolios are equally sorted into quintiles based on their prior year return (PRl YR, calculated through the end of May of year t to reduce the bias from bid-ask bounces and monthly return reversals). The interception of the five SZ, the five BM, and the five PR1 YR classifications results in a total of 125 benchmark portfolios. The value-weighted monthly returns on benchmark portfolios are calculated from July of year t to June of year t + 1. All benchmark portfolios are rebalanced each year.
Once we form these 125 characteristic-based benchmark portfolios, calculating the excess return is straightforward. Each stock, in each year, is assigned to a benchmark portfolio according to its rank based on SZ, BM, and PR1 YR. Excess monthly returns of a particular stock are then calculated by subtracting the stock's corresponding benchmark portfolio's returns from the stock's returns. Specifically, the characteristics-adjusted return is defined as Fama and French (1993) ; and RPR1YR,tis the momentum factor. More specifically, RHML is the book-to-market factor and is the difference between the return on a portfolio of high (the top 30%) book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio of low (the bottom 30%) book-to-market stocks (HML (High Minus Low)). R SMB is the size factor and is the difference between the return on a portfolio of small (the bottom 50%) stocks and the return on a portfolio of large (the top 50%) stocks (SMB (Small Minus Big)). RMkt is the market factor and is the return on the market portfolio. RpR1YR,t is the difference between the return on a portfolio of stocks with high (the top 50%) prior year returns and the return on a portfolio of stocks with low (the bottom 50%) prior year returns (PR1 YR, high minus low prior year return, skipping the return in the formation month). The momentum factor suggested by Carhart (1997) 
C. Excess Returns surrounding Earnings Announcements
Although our tests adjust returns with a characteristic-based benchmark as well as with a factor model, it is still plausible that the abnormal returns we observe reflect risk factors that are not accounted for by our benchmarks. To address this possibility, we provide an additional test in this section that is based on stock returns of past high and low CI firms around earnings announcement dates. If significant excess returns are generated because of benchmark errors, we expect them to accrue relatively smoothly over the year, since systematic risk is not likely to change a lot from day to day. However, if investors fail to appreciate the negative effects of overinvestment, they are likely to be unpleasantly surprised when the firms announce their earnings, implying that a significant portion of the abnormal performance for low CI firms over high CI firms will occur around the earnings announcements.4 This methodology, which was initially proposed by Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter (1992) to study overreaction, has been applied in several studies to test for the possibility that investors have biased expectations. For example, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) apply this approach to investigate the determinants of momentum profits and La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) apply this approach to examine the value/growth premium.
IV. Empirical Results

A. Distributional Characteristics of Returns on Portfolios Formed on Capital Investments
We first form five capital investment (CU) portfolios and then examine the relation between abnormal capital expenditures and subsequent stock returns on the CI portfolios. Starting with July of year t, we sort all stocks into quintiles based on their year t -1 capital investment measures in ascending order. The firms remain in these portfolios from July of year t to June of year t + 1. Based on these portfolios, we form a Cl-spread portfolio that has a $1 long position in the two lowest CI portfolios (the first and the second) and a $1 short position in the two highest CI portfolios (the fourth and fifth). The portfolios are rebalanced each year.
The distributional characteristics of the benchmark-adjusted returns on the CI portfolios are reported in panel A of Table 1. It is revealed that except for the lowest CI quintile, the benchmark-adjusted mean return decreases monotonically with abnormal capital investments. A further inspection shows that firms with high abnormal investments are penalized with negative benchmark-adjusted returns, while firms with low abnormal investments are rewarded with positive benchmark-adjusted returns more than half of the time during the sample period. The statistics on the Cl-spread portfolio shows that the mean excess return (0.168% per month) is above the median (0.119% per month) and is significantly different from zero with a p-value of less than 0.01. The statistics in panel A of The results presented in the last row of panel B in Table 1 suggest that the stock returns of firms that invest the least tend to outperform the stock returns of firms that invest the most for at least five years. The returns in year 2 (2.26%), year 3 (1.91%), year 4 (1.85%), and year 5 (1.64%) are all statistically indistinguishable from the year 1 returns and are all reliably different from zero. However, the average return on Cl-spread in year 6 after portfolio formation (not reported in Table 1 ) is 1.05% and is statistically insignificant. A close look at the year-toyear return on the CI-spread strategy reveals that low abnormal investment stocks outperform high abnormal investment stocks in about two-thirds of the years (column 2, panel B, Table 1 The observed time-series return pattern coincides, however, with the wave of the hostile takeover and merger activity, and is consistent with our empire builder explanation. In a paper that discusses the rise and fall of hostile takeovers since the 1980s, Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) finds that the number of leverage buyouts (LBOs) and hostile takeovers increased substantially in the 1984 to 1990 period. Our evidence suggests that the CI-spread returns were very high in the 1970s when lax corporate governance and a weak takeover market allowed firms to overinvest. However, after 1984, many of the firms with a tendency to overinvest were subject to either hostile takeovers, or were forced to make valueimproving changes to preempt these takeovers. In either case, the empire builders would be expected to exhibit positive abnormal returns in this subperiod. However, because of various impediments to takeovers introduced in the late 1980s, the relation between abnormal investments and returns may have again reversed in the later period. We therefore define the hostile takeover period as 1984 to 1989, which corresponds with the monthly return period from July of 1984 to June of 1990.
C. The Relation between Capital Investments and Stock Returns
The statistical tests of the benchmark-adjusted returns on the CI portfolios are presented in Table 2 . Since empire builders were subject to hostile takeovers in the 1984 to 1989 period as evidenced in panel B of Table 1 , in addition to reporting results in all years, we also report results in non-hostile takeover years and in hostile takeover years separately. The results for benchmark-adjusted returns from all years (column 2) demonstrate that one of the two low investors is statistically significantly positive at the 5% level, while both of the two high investors are significantly negative at the 5% level. In addition, the mean returns differ reliably from each other across the five CI portfolios as evidenced by the Wilks' Lambda statistics (F-value = 2.08 with a p-value of 0.026). Furthermore, the mean return on the Cl-spread portfolio is significantly positive with a value of 0.168% (t-value = 2.91) per month or 2.02% (12 x 0.168%) per year, indicating that firms that invest more realize lower stock returns than firms that invest less after controlling for size, book-to-market equity, and momentum effects. A further inspection on the mean excess returns indicates that the underperformance from high investors and the outperformance from low investors are not symmetric. High investors underperform the characteristic benchmarks by 0.105% (= (0.083 + 0.127)/2) per month, while low investors outperform the characteristic benchmarks by only 0.062% (= (0.042 + 0.083)/2) per month. Although our benchmarks control for return differences that arise because of differences in firm characteristics, the benchmarks do not necessarily control for factor risk. To control for factor risk, we regress benchmark-adjusted CI portfolio returns on the Carhart four factors. The results reported in Table 2 When the sample is divided into non-hostile takeover and hostile takeover years, it is obvious that the underperformance for high investors over low investors mainly comes from the non-hostile takeover period. In fact, low investors outperform high investors more in non-hostile takeover years than in all years. For instance, the risk-adjusted return for the Cl-spread portfolio increases from 0.192% per month in all years to 0.312% (t-value = 4.42) in non-hostile takeover years. Moreover, for the Cl-spread portfolio, both the mean excess return and the Fama-French intercept are significantly positive for the non-hostile takeover period but not for the hostile takeover period. In addition, during the hostile takeover period, high investors actually perform better though not significantly better than low investors. In fact, both the difference in the excess returns and the difference in the estimated Fama-French intercepts for the CI-spread portfolio between nonhostile takeover and hostile takeover periods differ reliably from zero, as reported in the last column of Table 2 . The significant differences are also confirmed by the nonparametric Wilcoxon Z-statistics (reported in braces { }) for the test of medians to be equal across the two periods.
D. Stock Returns around Earnings Announcement Dates
This section examines stock returns around earnings announcement dates and provides further evidence that the excess returns presented in the previous subsections are generated by errors in investor expectations rather than benchmark errors. Specifically, we examine the market-adjusted returns (raw returns minus the returns on the market portfolio) over a three-day window centered around quarterly earnings announcement dates in each of the five years after portfolio formation.5 The earnings announcement dates are obtained from the COMPU-STAT quarterly industrial database. If the previously documented excess returns arise because investors have systematically biased expectations, then we expect that the excess returns will be substantially higher around earnings announcement dates when new information is realized.
For each quarter, the three-day market-adjusted returns are equally weighted across all stocks in a given CI portfolio to compute the portfolio's average event date market-adjusted return. These quarterly earnings announcement date marketadjusted returns are then aggregated into annual intervals by summing up the four quarterly earnings announcement date market-adjusted returns in each of the five post-formation years. For comparison purposes we also calculate annual buy-andhold market-adjusted returns on a given CI portfolio by equally weighting the individual stock's annual market-adjusted returns across all stocks in the portfolio. The individual stock's annual market-adjusted return is computed by compounding the 12 monthly market-adjusted returns on the stock. Table 3 presents annual earnings announcement date market-adjusted returns (event returns) as well as annual buy-and-hold market-adjusted returns for the five CI portfolios in each of the five years after portfolio formation for the whole sample period. It also presents the average market-adjusted returns on the CIspread portfolio for the three different study periods. The table reveals a pattern of announcement date market-adjusted returns that is consistent with the pattern reported in Table 2 . In particular, panel A of Table 3 shows that in the first year following the formation date the cumulative earnings announcement date marketadjusted returns decrease monotonically with CI. The event date market-adjusted return of the CI-spread portfolio over these 12 trading days is 0.79% which represents about 24% of the 3.33% total difference in the first-year returns between low CI firms and high CI firms, as summarized in panels B and C.6 The table also reveals that the substantially positive announcement date market-adjusted returns on the Cl-spread portfolio are statistically significant in the first three years after the formation date. As one might expect, the magnitude of the excess returns decreases as the time elapsed from the formation date increases.
The evidence in panel C of Table 3 and test results not reported in the table indicate that earnings announcement date market-adjusted returns are substantially different from each other across the non-hostile takeover and hostile takeover periods. The observed pattern of announcement date market-adjusted returns mainly 5 We use daily market-adjusted returns instead of daily benchmark-adjusted returns to compute the abnormal returns around the earnings announcement dates, since the daily benchmark-adjusted returns are not readily available. However, by inspection of the monthly return behavior on the five CI portfolios based on both benchmark-adjusted returns and market-adjusted returns, we find that the monthly return patterns are virtually identical between these two measures of returns. However, the magnitudes are higher for the market-adjusted returns than for the benchmark-adjusted returns, which suggests that the reported results may be conservative.
6 For comparison, La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) find that a significant portion of the return difference between value and glamour stocks is attributable to earnings surprises. Specifically, they find that earnings announcement return differences account for approximately 25%-30% of the annual return differences between value and glamour stocks in the first three years after portfolio formation and approximately 15%-20% of the return differences over years four and five after formation. comes from the non-takeover period. In particular, the Cl-spread announcement date market-adjusted returns are significantly positive in all five years after the formation during the non-hostile takeover years, while they are all negative and statistically indifferent from zero during the takeover years. Our evidence suggests that earnings announcement returns contribute a good portion of return differential between the low and the high abnormal investments, suggesting that the return differential is not likely to be generated by benchmark measurement errors.
V. The Cross-Sectional Determinants of the C/-Return Relationship
The results in the previous section indicate that in the pre-and post-hostile takeover years, there is a strong negative relation between abnormal investment expenditures and returns, whereas in the hostile takeover years, the relation becomes positive though not significant. In this section, we examine the crosssectional determinants of this CI-return relation. Specifically, we explore how this Cl-return relation is influenced by variables such as cash flows and debt ratios that are likely to be related to empire building tendencies. Given that the relations between CI and returns appear to be different between non-hostile takeover years and hostile takeover years, we examine those years separately. Jensen (1986) argues that those firms with the highest cash flows and the lowest leverage ratios are more likely to overinvest than less levered firms with low cash flows. If this is true, one might expect to observe a stronger negative Cl-return relationship among firms with either high cash flows or low leverage. In the next three subsections, we test the Jensen hypothesis based on cash flows, leverage ratios, and the combined effects.
A. The Relation between Cash Flows and the Abnormal Capital Investment/Return Relation
To test whether or not cash flows have any effect on the negative Cl-return relationship, we first form 10 test portfolios based on cash flows (CFs) and CIs as follows. Starting with July of year t, we place all stocks into two groups according to their year t -l's cash flows. Cash flow, which is scaled by total assets, is measured as operating income before depreciation minus interest expenses, taxes, preferred dividends, and common dividends. If a firm's CF is below the median CF of the year, it is designated as part of the low CF group; otherwise it is placed in the high CF group. Within each CF group, stocks are equally sorted into quintiles based on their year t -l's CIs in an ascending order. As a result, we have a total of 10 portfolios based on the CF and CI classifications. The returns of a particular stock are adjusted for its corresponding characteristic-based benchmark portfolio returns. We then calculate each portfolio's value-weighted monthly excess returns from July of year t to June of year t+ 1, and then rebalance the portfolios in June of year t + 1.
We further form two CI-spread portfolios, one for the low CF group and the other for the high CF group. In addition, we form one HML CF CI-spread portfolio. The CI-spread portfolio denotes a zero-investment portfolio that has a $1 long position in the lowest two CI portfolios and a $1 short position in the highest two CI portfolios for a given CF group. The HML CF Cl-spread portfolio is the one that has a long position in the high CF CI-spread portfolio and a short position in the low CF CI-spread portfolio. Forming portfolios in this way allows us to determine whether there is a differential pattern in the CI-return relation between low CF firms and high CF firms after controlling for the firm characteristics. We also regress CI portfolio returns on the Carhart four factors to control for risk. The Jensen agency argument suggests that the return on the HML CF Cl-spread portfolio will be positive.
The results reported in Table 4 are consistent with this agency explanation. Table 4 presents the monthly mean excess returns, the regression results on the 10 characteristic-adjusted CF/CI portfolios and the Cl-spread portfolios in each of the three study periods, and the difference between non-hostile takeover and hostile takeover periods. The median values and the Z-statistics of the nonparametric Wilcoxon test for the CI-spreads are reported in square brackets [ ] and braces { }, respectively. The last three rows in Table 4 provide the F-values of the Wilks' Lambda statistic for the test of whether means are equal across the CI portfolios. The dependent variable Rp,t is the excess return on a given CF/CI portfolio p in month t (described below). Refer to Table 2 for the descriptions of Rft, RHML,t, RSMB t, RMkt t, RpR1YR, All Years, Non-Takeover Years, Takeover Years, and Difference. Returns are in the percentage form. The CF/CI portfolios are formed as follows. At each June of year t, all stocks are assigned to two groups according to their CF values in year t -1. CF is measured as operating income before depreciation minus interest expenses, taxes, preferred dividends, and common dividends, and is scaled by total assets. If a firm's CF is above the median CF of the year, it is placed in the high CF group, otherwise in the low CF group. Within each CF group, stocks are sorted into quintiles based on their rankings in Cl measure in ascending order. Value-weighted excess returns on a portfolio are calculated from July of year t to June of year t + 1. HML CF C/-spread is the difference in C/-spreads between the high and low CF groups, where the C/-spread is constructed in the same way as described in Table 1 The results from the all-years sample indicate that the mean excess returns for high CF firms monotonically decrease with abnormal capital investments. This is not, however, the case for firms with low cash flows. Indeed, in the low CF subsample, the lowest CI portfolio experiences a significant negative return. In addition, the positive CI-spread is significant only for the high CF group (the CI-spread is 0.227% per month for the high CF group while it is only 0.078% for the low CF group). However, the difference in returns between the high and the low CF Cl-spreads (0.149% per month) is not statistically significant, as is also evidenced by the test result of Wilks' Lambda statistic on the mean returns of the CI-spread portfolios across the two cash flow groups.
These results get somewhat stronger when we control for risk using the Carhart four-factor model. The Wilks' Lambda test result suggests that the es-timated Fama-French intercepts are significantly different from each other across the five CI portfolios for both cash flow groups. The risk-adjusted return is significant only for the CI-spread portfolio of the high CF group with a value of 0.256% per month, and is insignificant for the low CF group with a value of 0.059% per month. This suggests that among firms with a high level of free cash flows, high CI firms tend to underperform low CI firms substantially, whereas the underperformance is much weaker among firms with a low level of free cash flows. A formal test on the HML CF CI-spread portfolio indicates that a return difference of 0.197% per month in the CI-spreads between the high and the low CF firms is marginally significant at the 10% level. It suggests that after accounting for the characteristics and risk factors, the negative CI-return relationship is stronger among firms with higher levels of cash flows than among firms with lower levels of cash flows, which supports the managerial agency/overinvestment explanation suggested by Jensen (1986) .
The results from non-takeover years vs. takeover years clearly suggest that the above CI-return pattern mainly comes from non-takeover years rather than from takeover years. Specifically, the estimated Fama-French intercepts differ reliably from each other across the five CI portfolios for both CF groups for the non-hostile takeover period, but it is not the case for the hostile takeover period. Moreover, both the difference in the mean excess returns and the difference in the Fama-French intercepts of the high CF Cl-spread between the non-takeover and takeover periods are reliably different from zero. The evidence of the nonparametric test of medians (not reported here) also supports this conclusion.
B. The Relation between Debt Ratios and the Abnormal Capital
Investment/Return Relation This same procedure described above is also used to determine whether a firm's debt ratio affects the CI-return relation. We form 10 portfolios based on the debt-to-assets ratio (DA) and the capital investment (CI) classifications and then form two Cl-spread portfolios and one HML DA Cl-spread portfolio. The debt-to-assets ratio is defined as the ratio of long-term debt over the sum of longterm debt plus the market value of firm's equity. If a firm's debt-to-assets ratio is below the median debt-to-assets ratio of the year, the firm is assigned to the low debt group; otherwise it is assigned to the high debt group. The Jensen agency argument suggests that the HML DA Cl-spread should be negative. Table 5 reports the average returns on benchmark-adjusted DA/CI portfolios, the regression results on the Carhart four factors, and the across periods tests on the mean returns and the Fama-French intercepts. The results from all years show that the characteristics-adjusted returns monotonically decrease with the CI measures for the low DA sample but not for the high DA sample. In addition, the characteristics-adjusted returns on the Cl-spread portfolios are significantly positive for the low DA sample (0.225% per month) but not for the high DA sample (0.099% per month). The difference in returns between the high DA and the low DA CI-spreads (HML DA CI-spread = -0.126% per month) is not statistically significant, but becomes marginally significant at the 10% level when we control for risks using the Carhart four-factor model. The test results also suggest that the risk-adjusted returns are significantly different from each other across the five CI portfolios for both DA groups. In addition, both the difference in excess returns and the difference in the estimated Fama-French intercepts between the nonhostile takeover and hostile takeover periods are significantly different from zero, for both the high DA and the low DA CI-spreads. Again, this evidence and the evidence from the nonparametric test of medians are driven by the non-takeover years and are consistent with the agency explanation. The dependent variable Rp,t is the excess return on a given DA/CI portfolio p in month t (described below). Refer to Table  2 for descriptions of Rft, RHML,t, RSMB t, RMkt,t, RPR1 YR, All Years, Non-Takeover Years, Takeover Years, and Difference. Returns are in the percentage form. The DA/CI portfolios are formed as follows. At each June of year t, all stocks are assigned to two groups according to their values in debt-to-assets ratio DA in year t -1. DA is defined as the ratio of long-term debt over the sum of long-term debt and the market value of firm's equity. If a firm's DA is above the median DA of the year, it is designated to the high debt group, otherwise to the low debt group. Within each DA group, stocks are sorted into quintiles based on their rankings in CI measure in ascending order. Value-weighted excess returns on a portfolio are calculated from July of year t to June of year t + 1. HML DA C/-spread is the difference in the C/-spread between the high and low DA groups, where the C/-spread is constructed in the same way as described in Table 1 Tables 4 and 5 . Ci,t-1 is the abnormal capital investments measure for firm i. To be consistent with our results reported in Tables 4 and 5 , we use dummy variables DCF and DDA to assign a firm's cash flow (CF) and debt to assets ratio (DA). If a firm's CF is above the median CF of the year, then DCF equals one and zero otherwise. DDA is defined in the same way. In addition, to reduce the impact from the extreme outliers, the top and bottom 1.5% of the observations (based on characteristics-adjusted returns) are excluded from the sample. The Jensen (1986) managerial agency/overinvestment explanation predicts that A1 < 0, A2 < 0, and A3> 0. The test results are presented in Table 6 . The results from Models 1 and 2 are basically consistent with those reported in Tables 4 and 5. More specifically, the results from all years indicate that the regression coefficients on both CI and CIxDCF are significantly negative. The results suggest that the Cl-return relationship is negative and that this negative relationship is significantly stronger for high CF firms, consistent with our findings in Table 4 . We also find that the regression coefficient on CI is significantly negative at the 5% level whereas the regression coefficient on CIx DDA is significantly positive at the 10% level. The results indicate that the CI-return relationship is strongly negative and that this negative relationship is marginally stronger for low DA firms, consistent with our findings in Table 5 . When both CIx DCF and CIx DDA are simultaneously considered in the regression, the coefficients on CI and CIxDCF are still significantly negative, the coefficient on CIx DDA remains positive but it becomes insignificant.7 7 Notice that the independent variable in equation (4) t+A1l,tCli,t_1+2,tCli,t-1xDCFi,t-1+ei,t,t=1,. ..,T, Model2:Rit-AO,,t+1,tCli,t-1+/3,tCli,t-1xDDAi,t-1+ei,t,t=1,...,T, Model3:Rit-Ao,t+1,tCli,t-1+A2,tCli,t-1xDCFi,t-1+\3,tC1i,t-1xDDAi,t-,1+ei,t,t=1...,T, where Ri,t is the benchmark-adjusted value-weighted return on individual stock i at time t. It is weighted by the firm's market value relative to the total market value for a given Cl rank in a given year multiplied by 1,000. Cl is the capital investment measure. DCF and DDA are the dummy variables based on cash flow (CF) and debt to assets ratio (DA), respectively. CF is measured as operating income before depreciation minus interest expenses, taxes, preferred dividends, and common dividends, and is scaled by total assets. If a firms CF is above the median CF of the year, DCF equals one, otherwise DCF equals zero. DA is defined as the ratio of long-term debt over the sum of long-term debt and the market value of firms equity. If a firms DA is above the median DA of the year, then DDA equals one, otherwise DDA equals zero. To reduce the inference from extreme outliers, the bottom and top 1.5% of the observations (based on adjusted return variable) are excluded from the sample. Panel A reports the regression results for all years, panel B for non-takeover years, and panel C for takeover years. All years refer to the whole sample period (July 1973 to June 1996). Takeover years refer to the period of time from 1984 to 1989. Non-takeover years refer to the period that excludes the takeover years. t-values are in parentheses. * and ** represent significance at the 0.10 and 0.05 levels, respectively.
The results from the non-hostile takeover period vs. the hostile takeover period suggest that the impact of cash flow and debt ratio on the negative CI-return relationship primarily comes from the non-hostile takeover period. In sum, the Fama-MacBeth regression results confirm our findings in the previous subsections that the outperformance of low CI firms over high CI firms is stronger for those firms with the least financial constraints and that these results exist only in the non-hostile takeover period.
characteristics-adjusted returns, all slope coefficients are statistically significant for both the all-years sample and the non-hostile takeover years sample with predicted signs.
VI. Robustness of the Cl-Return Relation
A. The Contrarian Effect
The firms in our sample with high abnormal capital expenditures tend to have experienced above average stock returns in the preceding years. For instance, the past five-year raw returns on the five CI portfolios ranked from the lowest CI to the highest CI are 81.53%, 114.50%, 132.85%, 145.64%, and 153.77%, respectively. Hence, it is possible that the capital investment effect that we have documented is driven by the contrarian effect that was previously documented by De Bondt and Thaler (1985) .
To examine this more closely, we independently sort firms into quintiles determined by both the past five-year returns of their stocks (PR) and the level of their abnormal capital expenditures (CI). We also form five CI-spread portfolios and five PR-spread portfolios.8 The returns on the resulting portfolios are reported in Table 7 . The results indicate that there is clearly an abnormal capital expenditure effect (i.e., low CI firms outperform high CI firms) that is independent of the contrarian effect in all years and in non-hostile takeover years. For instance, the Cl-spread is generally positive for a given PR rank as shown in both panels A and B of Table 7 ; and the average CI-spread is statistically significant with a value of 0.285% per month as shown in panel B. In addition, our unreported test shows that the average CI-spread differs reliably across the non-takeover and takeover periods while the average PR-spread does not. The evidence here suggests that after controlling for firm characteristics and the contrarian effect, the CI effect remains strong, especially for the non-hostile takeover period.
However, our results also reveal a contrarian effect, which is weak and statistically insignificant after controlling for the CI effect.9 In addition, as shown in panel C of Table 7 , the contrarian effect is negative in the hostile takeover years when the CI effect is negative. Indeed, unconditionally (that is, when we do not sort on CI) our unreported result indicates that the contrarian effect is negative in the hostile takeover years. Hence, our evidence suggests that it is more likely that the contrarian effect is caused by the capital investment effect than vice versa.
B. The Effect of New Equity Offerings
Past research documents that companies that issue new equity, either initial public offerings (IPOs) or seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), subsequently realize poor long-run stock price performance (Loughran and Ritter (1995), Cai and Wei (1997), and others). Firms that issue new equity generally have higher levels of capital expenditures (relative to total assets) than non-issuing firms (Loughran and Ritter (1997)). Our own evidence also indicates that firms that issue equity in the previous year invest more than those that do not have new equity issues. Table 7 for the detailed description of portfolio construction. 9 To check the robustness of our results, i) we also rank the stocks based on the past three-year returns instead of the past five-year returns, and ii) we sort the stocks first based on the past returns and then the CI-measures or the reverse. The unreported results indicate that the return patterns are almost identical to those reported in Table 7 . More specifically, there exists a capital investment effect that is independent of the contrarian effect. Specifically, the value-weighted average and the simple average of CI measures for firms in our sample that have not issued new equity in the previous year are 0.014 and 0.091, respectively, while those averages for firms that have issued new equity in previous years are 0.071 and 0.170, respectively. Adverse selection models, like Myers and Majluf (1984) , suggest that the negative stock returns associated with high capital investments should be concentrated in those firms that fund their capital expenditures with SEOs. To examine whether the observed negative abnormal investment/return relation is attributable to these new equity offering firms, we reexamine the benchmark-adjusted return differences between high and low investors that have not issued stock in any year from year -5 to year -1. The test results are reported in Table 8 . The underperformance of high investors relative to low investors remains the same. Specifically, the benchmarkadjusted return on the CI-spread portfolio in the all-years period is 0.186% per month (2.23% per year) with a t-value of 3.34. The corresponding risk-adjusted return is 0.208% per month (2.50% per year) with a t-value of 3.43. Again, the CI effect is significant in non-takeover years but it reverses and is insignificant in takeover years. This evidence suggests that the observed negative Cl-return relation is not driven by the SEO effect and is also supported by evidence from a test on medians.10 The dependent variable Rp,t is the excess return on a given CI portfolio p in month t. Only firms that have not raised new equity in the past five years after a new issue are included in the sample. The five CI portfolios are formed based on their CI measures in year t -1 and rebalanced each year. Refer to Table 2 for 
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VII. Conclusion
This paper documents a negative relation between abnormal capital investments and future stock returns. Firms that increase their level of capital investment the most tend to achieve lower stock returns for five subsequent years. Our evidence suggests that the negative relation between abnormal investments and stock returns cannot be explained by either the risks or the characteristics of the to The unreported results indicate that the benchmark-adjusted return pattern on the Cl-spread portfolio that excludes firms that have issued new equity in any of the past five years also persists for at least five years. Specifically, the returns are 2.49% (t -3.23) for year 1, 2.67% (t -3.11) for year 2, 2.15% (t -2.67) for year 3, 2.26% (t = 2.47) for year 4, and 1.71% (t -1.98) for year 5 and the five-year cumulative benchmark-adjusted return is 9.91% (t-3.00). If we exclude firms that have issued new equity in the formation year only, the results are virtually identical to those reported here and in Table 8. firms and are independent of the previously documented long-term return reversal and secondary equity issue anomalies.
In theory, increased investment expenditures can provide both favorable and unfavorable information. The favorable information is that the firm that invests more is likely to have better investment opportunities and the unfavorable information is that firms that invest more are more likely to be managed by individuals who have a tendency to overinvest. Our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that investors tend to underestimate the importance of the unfavorable information about managerial intentions. First, we find that the negative abnormal capital investment/return relation reverses in the 1984-1989 period, a period in which an active takeover market disciplined firms that overinvested. Second, we find that the negative CI-return relation is stronger for firms with higher cash flows or/and lower debt ratios, which probably have a greater tendency to overinvest.
There are, of course, other potential explanations for the negative CI-return relation that we did not consider. One possibility is that stocks have time-varying rates of return and firms choose to invest more when the expected return on their stock or, in other words, their cost of equity capital is unusually low. For example, if the market unduly rewards some firms for high levels of investment (e.g., the Internet firms in the late 1990s), then one might expect those firms to increase their investments and subsequently realize low returns. In this case, the low future returns can be viewed as a cause, rather than the effect, of high abnormal capital expenditures. Lamont (2000) examined this hypothesis using aggregate nonresidential U.S. investment data and found support for this hypothesis. More recently, Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2002) explore the hypothesis that the degree to which a firm is over-or undervalued affects investment choices. While this possibility clearly warrants future research, it is not clear whether this explanation is consistent with either our time-series or cross-sectional findings.
A similar argument can be made within the context of a rational model, where future expected rates of return are determined by risk rather than mispricing. For example, Li, Vassalou, and Xing (2002) propose and test a model where a positive shock to the marginal product of capital, which can increase investment, simultaneously decreases risk, which would reduce the expected rate of return. Since their tests are designed to explain the returns of size and book-tomarket sorted portfolios, they cannot be directly related to our tests that examine excess returns relative to benchmarks that are based on these same characteristics. However, it is possible that the excess return associated with abnormal investment expenditures is in fact related to risk factors that are unrelated to the factors we consider. A careful consideration of this possibility is also a potentially fruitful topic for future research.
